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Mary Lou Cornella v. Churchill County, et al., 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 58 (August 12, 2016)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: VAGUENESS
Summary
The Court considered constitutional challenges to NRS 484B.657(1),2 which provides
that a defendant is guilty of vehicular manslaughter if “while driving or in actual physical control
of any vehicle, [the defendant] proximately causes the death of another person through an act or
omission that constitutes simple negligence.”3 Petitioner Mary Lou Cornella (“Cornella”)
challenged the phrases “an act or omission” and “simple negligence” as unconstitutionally void
for vagueness. Additionally, Cornella challenged that a showing of “simple negligence”, rather
than criminal intent, violates her right to due process. The Court held that so long as “an act or
omission”, as used in NRS 484B.657(1), is read to require an unlawful act or omission, like a
traffic violation, and “simple negligence”, as used in NRS 484B.657(1), is read as ordinary
negligence, the terms are not unconstitutionally vague. Further, vehicular manslaughter closely
resembles a traditional public welfare offense, and thus does not violate due process even
without a criminal intent requirement. The district court, however, erroneously upheld the
constitutionality of NRS 484B.657(1) without interpreting the phrase “act or omission” so the
Court directed the district court to reconsider Cornella’s direct appeal.
Background
Cornella ran over and killed 12-year old Brittany Cardella, who was riding her bicycle,
when Cornella drove through an intersection controlled by a four-way stop sign in Fallon,
Nevada. The State charged Cornella with two misdemeanor counts: (1) failure to yield the right
of way under NRS 484B.257,4 and (2) vehicular manslaughter under NRS 484B.657(1).
In a bench trial, the justice court dismissed count one because a bicycle is not a vehicle
pursuant to NRS 484A.320.5 However, the justice court denied Cornella’s motion challenging
the vehicular-manslaughter statute as unconstitutionally vague at trial and found her guilty of
vehicular manslaughter under NRS 484B.257. Cornella appealed to the district court, which
upheld Cornella’s convictions without addressing Cornella’s arguments regarding vagueness.
Thereafter, Cornella filed her petition for a writ of certiorari to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Discussion
I.
A criminal law may be vague for two reasons: “(1) if it fails to provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or (2) if it is so standardless that it
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authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”6 When applying this two prong
test to a criminal penalty, the court looks to whether “vagueness permeates the text,” in which
case the statute is “void in most circumstances.”7 The court first looked to see if the phrases “an
act or omission” and “simple negligence” as used in NRS 484B.657(1) make the statute void for
vagueness.
“An act or omission” denotes an unlawful act or omission
To sustain a negligent-vehicular-homicide conviction, there must be evidence of a traffic
violation. Traffic laws establish the degree of care required by drivers. A violation of a traffic
law is a deviation from the degree of care, and therefore an “act or omission” as used in NRS
484B.657(1). Also, Nevada is one of a few states to criminalize simple negligence without
requiring an underlying unlawful act, even though it would be difficult for people to abide by a
negligence statute that didn’t require an unlawful act or omission.
“Simple negligence” denotes “ordinary negligence”
The Nevada Supreme Court recognizes three types of negligence: ordinary, gross, and
criminal.8 “When the Legislature does not specifically define a term, ‘this Court presume[s] the
Legislature intended to use words in their usual and natural meaning.’”9 Since Black’s Law
Dictionary notes that “ordinary negligence” and “simple negligence” are coextensive terms with
the same meaning as negligence,10 and other jurisdictions equate simple negligence with
ordinary negligence,11 the Court concluded “simple negligence,” as used in NRS 484B.657(1),
denotes ordinary negligence.
Under the second prong of the vagueness analysis, the unlawful act or omission
requirement is not so “standardless” to result in “seriously discriminatory enforcement” because
it is an objective standard. Therefore, NRS 484B.657(1) is not void for vagueness.

II.
The Court first noted that some level of intent or culpability is required to punish
someone for a crime, but that despite that, some crimes are punished in the absence of this
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requirement, including “public welfare offenses”.12 In Nevada, vehicular manslaughter under is
considered a public welfare offense. Therefore, simple or ordinary negligence is sufficient to
meet due process requirements.
A crime may be treated as a public welfare offense requiring only ordinary negligence
when it: (1) is not rooted in the common law, (2) involves a small penalty, (3) does not tarnish
the character of the offender, and (4) is of a type that a person could reasonably be expected to
abide by.13 Under this test, Nevada’s vehicular manslaughter statute closely resembles a public
welfare offense, and therefore does not require criminal intent. First, negligent vehicular
manslaughter was not a crime at common law. Second, vehicular manslaughter in Nevada is only
a misdemeanor and generally carries relatively light punishment. Further, Nevada has a separate
offense to vehicular manslaughter which includes a criminal intent closer to criminal or gross
negligence and carries with it a greater punishment.14 Third, the Court noted that although
serving a brief sentence in a county jail may slightly harm the character of the offender,
vehicular manslaughter does not encompass “evil conduct.”15 Finally, since NRS 484B.657(1)
requires an unlawful act, a person could reasonably be expected to abide by the conduct required
of them. Additionally, since traffic laws are akin to public welfare offenses, the public should be
able to reasonably comply with their terms.
Conclusion
Previously, the district court failed to correctly interpret the phrase “an act or omission”
as requiring an unlawful act or omission. Thus, the Court ordered the district court to reconsider
Cornella’s direct appeal by applying NRS 484B.657(1) consistent with the underlying opinion.
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